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“Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination «, a cargo de Gonzalo Cisternas (MIT Sloan).


El Centro de Economía Aplicada del Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial y El Instituto Milenio para la Investigación en Imperfecciones de Mercado y Políticas Publicas de la Universidad de Chile, tienen el agrado de invitarlo a la presentación del paper:

“Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination «, a cargo de Gonzalo Cisternas (MIT Sloan).

We study the implications of tracking consumers and aggregating purchase histories into scores, numerical proxies for their unobserved willingness to pay. In our framework, a consumer interacts with a sequence of firms in a stationary Gaussian setting. Each firm relies on the consumer’s current score–modeled as a linear aggregate of past quantity signals discounted exponentially–to learn about her preferences and to set prices. In equilibrium, the consumer reduces her demand to drive average prices below the no-information benchmark. Firms’ learning–and thus, their ability to price discriminate–is maximized by scores that overweigh signals relative to Bayes’ rule when observing disaggregated data. In markets with high average willingness to pay, the benefits from low prices dominate the losses from better tailored prices, and thus consumers want to be tracked. Finally, hidden scores–those only observed by firms–reduce demand sensitivity, increase expected prices, and reduce expected quantities.


El seminario se realizará el MARTES 18 DE DICIEMBRE a las 13:30hrs., en la SALA 316 de BEAUCHEF 851, PISO 3, Depto. de Ingeniería Industrial.

Próximos seminarios CEA-MIPP MES DE DICIEMBRE

Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University)
Miércoles, 19 de diciembre; 13:00 – 14:00
Sala 316, piso 3, BP 851, DII

Más información se encuentra disponible en nuestra página web: http://www.mipp.cl/seminars