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Seminario CEA-MIPP: «Information exchange through secret vertical contracts», Nicolas Riquelme, (Universidad de los Andes)


Los invitamos al ciclo de  SEMINARIOS ACADEMICO CEA- MIPP:

Cuándo: 16 de noviembre de 2022 – 12:00 PM Santiago.
Dónde: Sala Consejo (401), Beauchef 851, piso4 | Departamento de Ingeniería
Tema: Information exchange through secret vertical contracts.
Presenta: Nicolás Riquelme (Universidad de los Andes)

We study a common agency problem in which two downstream firms, who are
local monopolists and receive private demand signals, offer secret menus of
two-part tariff contracts to their common supplier. While direct
communication is not possible, they may still exchange their information
through signal-contingent menus of vertical contracts. We show that a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in which information is transmitted, and
downstream firms obtain nearly the first-best industry surplus. The use of
both fixed charges and slotting fees is necessary for such a result. Our
results suggest that efficient collusion with market allocation may not
necessitate direct communication.

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